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Abstract
Capture the flag (CTF) has been applied with success in
cybersecurity  education,  and  works  particularly  well
when  learning  offensive  techniques.  However,
defensive security and incident response do not always
naturally fit the existing approaches to CTF. We present
Hackerbot,  a  unique  approach  for  teaching  computer
security:  students  interact  with  a  malicious  attacker
chatbot, who challenges them to complete a variety of
security  tasks,  including  defensive  and  investigatory
challenges.  Challenges are randomised using SecGen,
and deployed onto an oVirt infrastructure. 
Evaluation  data  included  system performance,  mixed
methods  questionnaires  (including  the  Instructional
Materials Motivation Survey (IMMS) and the System
Usability  Scale  (SUS)),  and  group  interviews/focus
groups. Results were encouraging, finding the approach
convenient,  engaging,  fun,  and  interactive;  while
significantly decreasing the manual marking workload
for  staff.  The  cloud  infrastructure  deployment  using
SecGen/oVirt  was  a  success,  generating  VMs  with
randomised challenges, and enabling students to work
from home. 
1. Introduction
Computer  security  education  benefits  from  hands-on
interactive learning activities. Capture the flag (CTF)
has been applied with success in education [1]–[4], and
works  particularly  well  when  learning  offensive
techniques.  However,  defensive  security  and  incident
response  do  not  always  naturally  fit  the  existing
approaches to CTF.  Defensive and investigative tasks
can be effective when they are interactive, where there
is a separate actor (such as a red team) working against
the learners [5]. Our aim was to create a new approach
via automation and interactive immersion that supports
defensive  and  investigative  cybersecurity  scenarios,
enabling students  to  work  at  their  own pace  with an
interactive adversary.
We developed a free and open source software (FOSS)1
interactive chatbot, Hackerbot, which can be configured
to  attack  VMs;  presenting  a  variety  of security
challenges, rewarding correct solutions with flags.  We
deployed an oVirt infrastructure to host the VMs, and
leveraged  the  SecGen framework  [6] to  generate  lab
1 Hackerbot  is  incorporated  into the  SecGen project,
available at https://github.com/cliffe/SecGen 
sheets,  provision  VMs,  and  provide  randomisation
between students.
2. Related Literature
Capture the flag (CTF) is a type of cyber security game
which  involves  collecting  flags  by  solving  security
challenges.  CTF  events  give  professionals,  students,
and  enthusiasts  an  opportunity  to  test  their  security
skills  in  competition.  CTFs  emerged  out  of  the
DEFCON hacker conference  [7] and remain common
activities  at  cybersecurity  conferences and online  [8].
Some  events  target  students  with  the  goal  of
encouraging interest in the field: for example, PicoCTF
is an annual high school competition  [9], and CSAW
CTF  is an annual competition for students in Higher
Education (HE) [10].
Applications  of  CTF  scenarios  have  demonstrated
pedagogical utility when used within HE.  Challenges
have been adapted and used successfully in CTF-style
lab exercises  [1],  [2],  [11], in class competitions  [12]
and extra-curricular activities [4], [13].
Prior  work  on  the  Security  Scenario  Generator
(SecGen)  framework  aimed  to  solve  issues  present
when  using  static  CTF  challenges  in  assessment
situations  [6],  [14].  Hacking  challenge  scenarios  are
expensive  and  time  consuming  to  create  [15].  CTF
challenges should not typically be reused in assessment
situations, such as university assignments, competitions
or job recruitment,  as solutions and discussion of the
challenges  are  commonly  found  online.  SecGen
generates  random challenge content  and  unique flags
per  participant,  which  enables  the  reusability  of  a
scenario  within  the  same  class  of  students  whilst
limiting the potential for collusion [6], [14].
Gondree et al. [16] note the benefits of using automated
adversaries  in  computer  security  games.  When
compared  with  human  competitors,  automated
adversaries  can  have  increased  availability,  can  be
arbitrarily sophisticated and can be adapted to the level
of difficulty required based on the level of competition
or educational context.
3. Aims
Our aim was to create a new approach to cybersecurity
training  that  provides  interactive  immersion  while
supporting  defensive  and  investigative  security.  We
also  aimed  to  create  reusable  randomised  challenges
and  scenarios  that  could  be  used  for  learning  and
assessment purposes. Furthermore, we aimed to deploy
the lab challenges into a cloud-based infrastructure to
support distance access to the lab environment. Finally,
an  underlying  goal  was  to  create  an  enjoyable  and
usable experience for students, encouraging motivation
to engage in the course.
4. Methods
A design  science  research  approach  was  applied,  by
designing a solution, followed by implementation and
it’s  evaluation.  Implementation  included development
of  a  significant  private  cloud-based  infrastructure,
software  development  (including  chatbots  and
websites), vulnerable systems and security challenges,
and lab sheets.
After  the  semester  was  complete,  and  all  grades
returned, students were asked to complete a survey, and
participate  in  a  semi-structured  group  interview.  The
survey  included  questions  related  to  the  lab
infrastructure,  Hackerbot,  flag-based  chatbot
assessment structure and engagement, and any further
suggestions, and positive and negative comments. The
Instructional Materials Motivation Survey (IMMS) was
used  to  measure  student  engagement  and  motivation
(based on the ARCS model of  motivation: Attention,
Relevance, Confidence, and Satisfaction)  [17], and the
System Usability Scale (SUS) [18] was used to measure
usability. The IMMS survey is made up of 36 Likert
scale questions, which are used to calculate a score for
student  motivation.  The  SUS  has  10  Likert  scale
questions, and produces a non-linear usability score out
of 100. Both of these survey tools are well established
and extensively validated in the literature.  Qualitative
feedback received via the  survey was  analysed  using
thematic analysis. Each comment was coded and then
grouped into themes.
5. SecGen/oVirt Security Labs
5.1. oVirt Security Labs infrastructure
A pilot study was conducted to gather student feedback
regarding the interface and capabilities of oVirt for the
purpose of  cybersecurity education [19]. Based on this
pilot  study  we  concluded  that  oVirt  is  a  feasible
platform  on  which  to  build  a  lab  environment  for
teaching computer security. 
Consequently,  we  developed  an  oVirt  infrastructure
consisting of: a virtual data centre with 1 cluster and 3
hosts running oVirt node 4.1 (HPE Proliant DL360 Gen
9 servers, with 2 sockets, 12 core, 2 threads per core to
give  48  Logical  CPUs  in  each;  288GB  of  memory;
2x10Gb and 4x1Gb network sockets plus a 1Gb iLO
connection); 3 storage domains hosted on a NFS cluster
(with  a  Data  Domain;  ISO  Domain  and  Export
Domain);  the  students  VM  networks  used  the  1Gb
network connected to  an isolated switch;  the storage,
management,  migration,  and display networks used a
10Gb network.
Students  accessed  VMs  via  the  oVirt  user  portal.
Students were granted permissions to create VMs using
the many templates and ISOs we provided. VMs that
students  own  could  be  started,  stopped,  snapshots
created, and could be configured onto various logical
networks. From the user portal, console files could be
downloaded, which granted graphical/console access to
VMs via SPICE/VNC.
5.2. Accessing oVirt infrastructure remotely
The user portal was available from university labs, and
was available remotely via VPN and RDP access. This
enabled students to access VMs from home.
RDP  access  was  added  during  the  semester  due  to
problems  many  students  experienced  with  VPN
connections dropping. Accessing the infrastructure via
RDP  involved  logging  into  the  RDP  server,  which
displayed  the  VMs  on  the  remote  desktop  (via
SPICE/VNC), which was in turn displayed to students
over the RDP protocol connection. As a consequence,
students did not require any oVirt/SPICE/VNC specific
software installed.
5.3. Provisioning SecGen into an oVirt infrastructure
Figure 1: SecGen creates a project, then Vagrant creates VMs using
VirtualBox or oVirt, and provisions via Puppet
We extended SecGen  [6] with the ability to provision
VMs  to  oVirt.  Previously  SecGen  only  supported
creating VirtualBox VMs. Extending SecGen to support
oVirt leveraged the use of an existing Vagrant plugin
and  a  Ruby  gem  for  oVirt.  Templates  for  oVirt
matching  the  Virtualbox  base  boxes  were  created.
Figure 1 illustrates, that SecGen now supports options
for  creating  project  output  that  specifies  whether
Vagrant should deploy to oVirt or VirtualBox. Briefly,
SecGen  reads  its  options  (including  credentials  for
oVirt),  available  modules  (including  vulnerabilities,
security  network  services,  system  utilities,  and  OS
bases),  reads  the  required  scenario,  performs
randomisation,  and  generates  the  project  directory
output, which includes everything required for Vagrant
to  create  the  VMs  and  deploy  Puppet  to  provision
software and configuration changes.
5.4. Batch SecGen processing
To enable  us  to  provision  VMs for  entire  classes  of
students, we created a new service to run on a server to
provision from2. The batch_secgen.rb program runs
as  a  systemd service,  using  multiple  threads  to
continuously  process  a  queue  of  SecGen  tasks.  The
queue can be added to on the basis of a list of prefixes
to use for the VMs, such as a list of all the student IDs
for students in a class. SecGen was extended to support
specifying IP address ranges. Static IP address ranges
are generated for each scenario, and tracked to prevent
collisions  between  scenarios.  (A  future  enhancement
will  be  to  optionally  separate  students  further  via
logical networks.) 
We also developed a set  of  scripts  to  assign SecGen
generated  VMs  to  matching  oVirt  student  accounts,
automatically create snapshots, and do some additional
oVirt network configuration.
Each week throughout the module we deployed VMs
using SecGen, which created for each student a set of
VMs with randomised challenges and lab sheets. Each
week  involved  2  to  5  VMs.  In  total  32  VMs  were
created  for  each  of  the  77  students  enrolled  on  the
module;  for  a  total  of  2,464  VMs  (plus  testing  and
backup copies created). 
6. Hackerbot
6.1. Introducing Hackerbot
Here  we  present  Hackerbot,  which  was  designed  to
achieve the aims related to interactivity, and support for
defensive and investigative exercises.  Hackerbot is an
IRC  chatbot,  which  through  instant  messaging  (IM)
interaction, presents challenges to students, typically by
attacking/compromising  the  student’s  VMs,  and
challenging the student to defend, investigate, or restore
the VMs in exchange for CTF flags.
For each lab,  each student has a desktop VM, which
includes a client used to chat with the bot. Pidgin was
chosen  as  the  client,  since  it  presents  a  familiar  IM
interface to users (rather than a more traditional IRC-
focused  interface).  When  the  desktop  VM  starts,
Firefox  also  starts  displaying  the  student’s  lab  sheet,
which includes login details for their VMs.
A “hackerbot_server” VM also runs, serving up HTML
lab worksheets (which SecGen generates), and hosting
the Hackerbot  (whose configuration is also generated
by SecGen). Most of the weekly topics involved at least
one  other  server  or  desktop  system,  which  the
Hackerbot attacked or interacted with.
2 batch_secgen.rb  can  be  accessed  here:
https://github.com/cliffe/SecGen/tree/master/lib/batch
Figure 2: Hackerbot student interaction via Pidgin
6.2. Design of challenges
The lab exercises were adapted from previous iterations
of our Incident Response and Investigation module (as
described  in  [20],  where  we  noted  the  previously
demanding marking workload). Our previous approach
already had a lab focused assessment, with some guided
work followed by open-ended problem-based learning
challenges,  where  students  submitted  writeups  and
screenshots of completed tasks. 
Our approach was to design the exercises so that each
topic  lab  sheet  introduced  students  to  the  concepts,
provided  some  step-by-step  walk  through,  then
indicated that they should interact with Hackerbot to be
presented with a challenge, which puts these skills into
practice.  This  involved creating Hackerbot  challenges
directly related to the concepts, skills, and tools covered
by the  guided  exercises,  adapting  existing challenges
and replacing many of the less directly related problem-
based  learning  tasks.  This  approach  was  designed  to
further  improve  students’  confidence  in  the  covered
topics: putting more of what they learned into practice
more often. It was also possible for students to choose
to  skip  sections  of  the  lab  sheets,  and  focus  on  the
challenges, if they preferred.
6.3. Specification and generation of lab sheets
The challenges and labsheets are randomised for each
student  by  SecGen.  Each  topic  has  a  corresponding
SecGen  “hackerbot_config”  generator.  These
generators  produce  a  JSON  output  with  the  XML
configuration for the hackerbot (described in the next
section), and also the HTML lab sheet.
As illustrated in Figure 3, the lab sheets are written in
Markdown,  and  specified  as  ERB (Embedded RuBy)
template  files,  with  variables  for  generated  content,
such as usernames, passwords, and randomly selected
and/or  parameterised  challenges.  The  generated
markdown is rendered into HTML, shown in Figure 4.
# Integrity Management: Detecting Changes
## Getting started
### VMs in this lab
==Start these VMs== (if you haven't already):
- hackerbot_server (leave it running, you don't log
into this)
- desktop
### Your login details for the "desktop" VM
User: <%= $main_user %>
Password: tiaspbiqe2r (**t**his **i**s **a** 
**s**ecure **p**assword **b**ut **i**s **q**uite 
**e**asy **2** **r**emember)
Figure 3: Lab sheet markdown ERB snippet
Figure 4: Lab sheet as displayed in Firefox 
A  separate  “hackerbot”  SecGen  utility  module
provisions  VMs  with  the  Hackerbot  server  software,
and  the  configurations  and  lab  sheets  from  the
generators. Apache is installed to host the generated lab
sheets, and lab sheets are styled via CSS. 
A  SecGen  scenario  for  each  topic  specifies  all  the
systems, vulnerabilities, and content required. Figure 5
shows an extract of a scenario file specifying the Kali
Linux-based Hackerbot server.
6.4. Hackerbot configuration and interaction
Hackerbot  leverages  the  Cinch  framework  to  provide
IRC functionality  [21], and Programr  [22], to provide
an  Artificial  Intelligence  Markup  Language  (AIML)
based  chatbot  interaction  (as  used  by  the  seminal
Alicebot) [23].
The  behavior  of  the  Hackerbot  depends  on  its
configuration, and throughout the course a fairly linear
approach was taken: the Hackerbot first greets the user,
setting the scene, then presents the user with the first
challenge.  Typically  the  Hackerbot  will  give
instructions to the student, asking them to let her know
when they are ready. Often this involves a warning that
the  Hackerbot  is  about  to  take  some action,  such  as
hacking into one of the student’s servers, and what the
student  needs  to  accomplish,  such  as  preventing,
monitoring,  or  recovering  from  the  attack.  The
Hackerbot will perform any pre-shell commands (such
as running a port scan), followed by an attempt to gain
shell  on  a  system  (for  example,  by  launching  a
Metasploit exploit, or by SSHing to a system), followed
by running  any  post-exploitation  commands,  such  as
creating,  modifying,  or  deleting  files  from  the
compromised server. The standard IO output and errors
from  the  attack  commands  are  matched  against  to
resolve the action taken by the Hackerbot: triggering a
response  message,  and  progressing  to  the  next
challenge or  presenting  a  question  for  the  student  to
answer. Typically a correct solution was rewarded by a
message containing a flag that the student could submit
for marks. The Hackerbot can also list all the attacks,
and be instructed to skip to specific tasks (in response
to “list” and “goto 9”).
<system>
  <system_name>hb_server</system_name>
  <base distro="Kali" name="MSF"/>
  <service type="ircd"/>
  <utility module_path=".*metasploit_framework"/>
  <utility module_path=".*nmap"/>
  <utility module_path=".*handy_cli_tools"/>
  <service type="httpd"/>
  <utility module_path=".*hackerbot">
    <input into="hackerbot_configs">
      <generator module_path=".*integrity_protection">
        <input into="accounts">
          <datastore>accounts</datastore>
        </input>
        <input into="root_password">
          <datastore>desktop_root_password
          </datastore>
        </input>
      </generator>
    </input>
  </utility>
  <network type="private_network" >
    <input into="IP_address">
      <datastore access="1">IP_addresses</datastore>
    </input>
  </network>
  <build type="cleanup">
    <input into="root_password">
      <generator type="strong_password_generator"/>
    </input>
  </build>
</system>
Figure 5: Scenario file extract
 <attack>
<% $rand_port = rand(65535) %>
    <pre_shell>nmap -p <%= $rand_port %> 
{{chat_ip_address}} > /dev/null; echo $? </pre_shell>
    <get_shell>false</get_shell>
    <post_command>false</post_command>
    <prompt>Monitor the network traffic, and look out for
attempts to scan your desktop VM. You need to identify 
what port the connection attempt is to.</prompt>
    <condition>
      <output_matches>0</output_matches>
      <message>Hope you found the port number.</message>
      <trigger_quiz />
    </condition>
    <condition>
      <output_matches>1</output_matches>
      <message>:( Failed to scan </message>
    </condition>
    <quiz>
      <question>Now after the attack, what port number 
was scanned?</question>
      <answer>^<%= $rand_port %>$</answer>
      <correct_answer_response>
        :) <%= $flags.pop %>
      </correct_answer_response>
      <trigger_next_attack />
    </quiz>
  </attack>
Figure 6: Simple Hackerbot network monitoring challenge
 <attack>
    <get_shell>msfconsole -x "use 
exploit/unix/misc/distcc_exec; set RHOST <%= 
$web_server_ip %>; exploit"</get_shell>
    <post_command>whoami > /dev/null; echo "<%= 
$flags.pop %>" > /dev/null; echo 'Find the flag! (in the 
network traffic)'</post_command>
    <prompt>Your webserver is about to be 
scanned/attacked. Use Tcpdump and/or Wireshark to view the
behaviour of the attacker. There is a flag to be found 
over the wire. </prompt>
    <condition>
      <output_matches>Find the flag</output_matches>
      <message>Hope you caught that.</message>
      <trigger_next_attack />
    </condition>
    <condition>
      <output_matches>1</output_matches>
      <message>:( Failed to contact the web server (<%= 
$web_server_ip %>)</message>
    </condition>
    <else_condition>
      <message>:( Something was not right...</message>
    </else_condition>
  </attack>
Figure 7: Launching a Metasploit exploit
The  Hackerbot  service  has  an  XML  based
configuration, which specifies:
● The  directory  to  read  AIML chatbot  rules  for
responses to general chat
● Messages  to  use  in  response  to  specific
Hackerbot functionality
● Attack  pre-shell,  shell,  and  post-exploitation
actions, and subsequent behavior
The  following  snippets  demonstrate  the  flexibility  of
the  approach.  Figure  6  demonstrates  a  very  simple
network monitoring challenge. Note that every student
is  generated  a  different  answer  and  flag.  Figure  7,
illustrates  launching  a  Metasploit  exploit  against  a
vulnerable server, and sending a flag across the network
as part of it’s post-exploitation actions.
Challenges developed ranged from protecting files from
change,  integrity  management  hash  techniques  for
monitoring for changes, creating and using differential
and incremental backups, live and offline analysis of a
compromised server,  network monitoring, and writing
IDS Snort rules for detecting attacks and exfiltration. In
total, eight Hackerbot labs and two tests were created.
7. Assessment structure and scoring front end
The  course  was  assessed  entirely  based  on  the
challenges presented by Hackerbot (with one exception,
the first week’s group task on risk assessment). 
30% flag submissions for labs:  Each lab was marked
automatically  based on flag  submissions,  which were
due two weeks after the scheduled lab. 
50%  scheduled  closed  book  tests:  Two  timed  tests
(worth  20%  and  30%)  where  each  student  was
presented  with  a  randomised  selection  of  challenges
adapted from the challenges in the labs.
20%  Lab  book  with  detailed  write-ups:  Students
submitted  a  detailed  technical  description  of  each
challenge  and  their  solution,  with  screenshots
illustrating how the challenges were completed. Every
lab task with flags submitted for marks was required to
be included in their write-up submission.
Flags were submitted via a Google form, which fed into
a  Google  spreadsheet,  which  automatically  marked
submissions in terms of individual flags for each topic.
The  marking  spreadsheet  ensured  that  each  flag  was
submitted by the matching student (and to the correct
topic), and applied late penalties per flag (5% per day,
for a maximum of 10 days late).
A BasicLTI (IMS Basic Learning Tools Interoperability
standard) website, “MyFlags”, was developed in PHP
to provide students with a view of their marks and flag
submissions for the lab topics and tests. Once logged
into the University’s Blackboard VLE, they could click
through to MyFlags, and remain authenticated, ensuring
that  students only had access to their own marks. As
illustrated  in  Figure  8,  MyFlags  included  a  tab
displaying overall marks, a tab to view every flag they
had  submitted  and  detailed  information  including
whether the flag was accepted and marks applied, and a
submission  tab.  MyFlags  loaded  results  by  accessing
CSV shares of the marking spreadsheet. The CSV data
was cached so that MyFlags could load quickly, while
the  cache  was  updated  in  the  background  from  the
Google spreadsheet.
Figure 8: MyFlags, a BasicLTI PHP flag submission frontend for
Google Form/Sheet scoring
8. Results
8.1. Evaluation methods
This  section  presents  the  results  of  the  evaluation  of
oVirt, Hackerbot, MyFlags, and the student experience.
Data gathered included system performance, technical
issues,  mixed  methods  questionnaires,  and  group
interviews/focus groups.
In total, the survey had a sample size of n=34 students.
This was followed by a group interview to capture any
qualitative  data  not  captured  via  the  survey.  Due  to
sample  size,  when  presenting  agreement  percentages,
we have grouped 1 or 2 as representing disagreement,
and 4 or 5 as agreement, on the 5 point Likert scale.
8.2. oVirt system performance
As described in  Section 5.4, 77 students had access to
at a minimum 32 VMs each. By the end of the semester
over 3,000 VMs had been created. We did not limit the
number  of  VMs  each  student  could  have  running
concurrently, and often students left VMs running when
not in use. It was not uncommon for over 600 VMs to
be running at a time. 
System performance of the infrastructure dealt with this
load  without  performance  issues.  As  of  writing,  the
current  4,261  VMs  on  our  oVirt  infrastructure  have
consumed 4.1 TB of storage. CPU usage has reached a
maximum  of  33%  with  400%  over  allocation.  The
maximum memory used was 48%. 
8.3. oVirt perceptions of suitability and convenience
oVirt  was  compared  to  the  infrastructure  used  in
previous security modules using Likert scale questions
(from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”) and
also open ended comments. Our approach in previous
security  modules  was  via  an  in-house  solution;  the
Image  Management  System  (IMS),  which  enables
students  to  save  and  restore  full  HDD  states  (with
various OSs) to a server across lab PCs. A server hosts
a collection of VMs (such as Windows, various Linux
systems,  Kali  Linux,  and  Metasploitable),  which
students can subsequently download.
The response to “IMS: this infrastructure gives me the
freedom to experiment and learn security concepts” was
78.1% in agreement (agree and strongly agree). Asked
the same question in relation to the oVirt infrastructure
87.1% were in agreement. A paired-samples t-test was
conducted to compare the perceived freedom and utility
of IMS and oVirt. There was no significant difference
in  the  freedom  to  experiment  and  learn  security
concepts  scores  for  IMS (M=4.0,  SD=0.9)  and  oVirt
(M=4.2, SD=0.9) conditions; t(60)=1.41, p = 0.17.
43.8% agreed that IMS was convenient and accessible;
in contrast 75.0% agreed that oVirt was convenient and
accessible.  A  paired-samples  t-test  was  conducted  to
compare the perceived convenience of IMS and oVirt.
There was a significant difference in the convenience
and accessibility scores for IMS (M=3.3, SD=1.3) and
oVirt (M=3.9, SD=1.2); t(62)=2.52, p = 0.01.
8.4. Remote access responsiveness
Of the 34 responses, 73.5% of students had worked on
oVirt from home. 24 accessed oVirt via the VPN, and 6
used  RDP  after  that  was  added  as  an  option.  The
perceptions of responsiveness of methods of accessing
were, on a scale of 1 - 5 rated as, M=3.9 for access on
campus; M=2.7 via the VPN, and M=3.2 via RDP.
Qualitative  feedback comparing oVirt  to IMS  was
positive  overall  (of  31  responses  27  were  mostly
positive  towards  oVirt,  with  4  mostly  negative
responses).  The most common theme in the feedback
on  oVirt  was  regarding  the  convenience  of  having
remote access (n=12). The speed to load was also noted
by many (n=10); it was much faster to get started, since
VMs could  simply  be  started  on  demand rather  than
first downloading IMS images and VMs. For example,
one  response  included:  “oVirt  is  accessible  from
outside of uni which means you can continue to work
from home if needed and this was really good because
you  didn't  have  to  stay  at  uni  all  day  to  complete
something  you  could  continue  it  later  if  needed.”
Closely  related  was  the  general  theme  of  freedom
(n=5), in terms of flexibility of working locations and
also running multiple VMs. There were technical issues
noted or hinted at in comments (n=7), described later in
Section 8.8. 
When  asked  for  an  overall  impression  of  using  the
oVirt system (positives and negatives), comments were
mostly positive, with differences from the comparison
with IMS including the theme that oVirt was easy to
use (n=6). It was noted that working from home was
slow via  the  VPN (n=6).  Feature  requests  were  also
common (n=9), described in Section 8.9.
8.5. Hackerbot student experience
The response to “Hackerbot increased my enjoyment of
this class” was 76.5% in agreement (agree and strongly
agree),  20.6%  neutral,  and  2.9%  disagreed,  (M=4.2,
SD=0.9).  When  asked  whether  they  “enjoyed  having
conversations  with  Hackerbot”,  answers  were  more
spread:  58.8%  were  in  agreement,  23.5%  neutral,
17.6% disagreed,  M=3.6,  SD=1.4.  88.2% agreed  that
they  “enjoyed  the  live  interaction  practicing  security
concepts with Hackerbot” (M=4.4, SD=0.9).
Qualitative  feedback  on  Hackerbot was  generally
positive. From the thematic analysis the most common
theme was that students found it fun and enjoyable to
learn via  the  Hackerbot  (n=11).  For example,  as  one
student  put  it:  “Using  the  Hackerbot  was  very
enjoyable and interesting. It allowed a human element
to  the  module  and  maximised  engagement  with  the
tasks and made the module easier to understand, fun
and memorable. The first few weeks saw many glitches
in the system and took a while to understand how it
works,  however student feedback was taken seriously
and  implemented  to  improve  the  system  [on]  a
continuous basis.” 
Another  related  theme  was  that  the  approach  was
interesting  and  unique  (n=6).  The  instant  feedback,
compared to waiting on manual marking, was also was
also noted (n=4). There were some comments related to
feature  requests  (n=2)  and  technical  issues  (n=6),
described in Sections 8.8 and 8.9.
Qualitative feedback on MyFlags included the most
common theme that  it  was good to have reassurance
that  flags  had  been  received,  and  to  track  progress
(n=13). However, the site was slow to update (n=12),
and there were feature requests (n=7).
8.6. Assessment structure and engagement
79.4% agreed (as above, agree and strongly agree) that
they  “prefer  the  structure  for  grades  in  this  class.”
91.2% “enjoyed having separate VMs pre-created for
each lab exercise”.  9.1% “found that  having different
(randomised)  lab  sheets  from  classmates  was
confusing.”  79.4%  agreed  that  “the  structure  of  the
assessment made me: complete more of the allocated
lab work.” 50.0% agreed it made them turn up to class
more often. 70.6% agreed they “enjoyed the assessment
tasks in this module”. 79.4% agreed feedback given in
this  module  helped  them  know  how  they  were
performing; and 45.5% found feedback helpfully timely
and fast (33.3% were neutral). 
The  Instructional  Material  Motivational  Survey
(IMMS) total  score mean for the module was 133.66
(M=133.66,  SD=25.20,  N=34).  Cronbach's  Alpha  for
the  36  item scale  (with  negatively  worded  questions
inverted)  was  0.95,  indicating  the  scale  was  highly
reliable.
The system usability scale (SUS) score for Hackerbot,
was a mean of 75.75 out of a possible maximum of 100
(M=75.75,  SD=16.37).  Cronbach's  Alpha  for  the  10
item scale (with negatively worded questions inverted)
was 0.87, indicating the scale was highly reliable.
Overall qualitative feedback for the module included
suggestions,  the  most  common  being  that  students
should be able to reset their own VMs (n=7). Students
could request VM resets via email, which occasionally
took some time.  Students  also  noted  that  there  were
some classes where VMs were not available in time for
class  (this  occurred  a  few  times,  due  to  errors
provisioning VMs (since resolved), and due dates were
adjusted accordingly) (n=5). 
The most  common positive  comment  for  the  module
overall  was  around  the  interactive  challenges,  which
provided  practical  experience  (n=6),  followed  by
finding  the  module  fun  (n=5),  engaging  (n=4),  and
interesting (n=4). The most common negative comment
in the overall feedback was that oVirt can be slow to
access at home, with some technical issues (n=7).
8.7. Group interview
During the group interviews, many of the same topics
were raised, with these these additional points:
● The difficulty of challenges was appropriate
● Having the freedom to work from home changed
the way they worked on the module
● They liked having weekly submissions, and the
ability to easily track their progress
● “The best module I’ve done in the three years”,
having learned a lot and now could confidently
use Linux
8.8. Technical issues
Technical issues encountered included:
● Remote  access  via  VPN  often  dropped
connections (leading to the introduction of RDP
as an alternative)
● It was possible for a student to break their VMs
(for example, some tasks had them editing and
changing the permissions of system files, which
can lead to a “bricked” VM), or get their VMs
into a state where it wasn’t possible to recover
(for  example,  if  they  didn’t  backup  files
correctly before they told Hackerbot they were
ready for an attack).
● Copy  and  paste  between  VMs  sometimes
stopped working
● A  few  challenges  had  problems,  and  students
were told to skip 4 challenges (which were not
marked) and issued corrections for some others
● Mouse  scroll  and  resolution  changing  didn’t
work in some VMs
● MyFlags was slow to sync flag submissions (and
before caching was added, it was slow to load)
8.9. Feature requests
Feature requests from students included:
● The ability for students to control the snapshots
on  their  VMs  (students  did  not  have  this
permission on the VMs generated)
● Improved  tracking  of  flags:  notifications  of
incorrectly  submitted  flags;  clearer  error
messages  for  incorrect  flags;  automatic
submission of flags (rather than being given the
flags by Hackerbot)
● More hints from Hackerbot after failed attempts
(Hackerbot does include hints in its replies but
this could be improved)
9. Discussion
Hackerbot  presents  a  unique  approach  to  teaching
cybersecurity,  which  we  contend  meets  the  aims
presented  in  Section  3.  On  a  practical  level,  our
developed  oVirt  infrastructure,  SecGen  server,  and
Hackerbot  labs  were  successfully  designed,
implemented, and deployed; although not without some
minor  technical  challenges.  This  new  approach  to
marking  overcame  the  practical  issues  we  faced  in
terms  of  the  marking  workload  in  our  previous
iterations  of  the  course  [20]. Although  development
took far longer than marking would have, much of this
time will not have to be re-invested for future delivery
of the course. 
The  cloud  infrastructure  deployment  using
SecGen/oVirt  was  a  success,  generating  VMs  for
students and enabling them to work from home. Results
showed  that  students  perceptions  of  both  IMS (local
VMs),  and oVirt  (virtual  desktop infrastructure)  were
positive in terms of facilitating study of cybersecurity.
However,  the  cloud-based  remotely  available  oVirt
infrastructure  was  significantly  more  convenient  for
students (despite speed and drop out issues with VPN
access). Students appreciated the speed with which they
could  get  started  on  work,  enjoyed  the  freedom  of
movement  it  afforded,  and  appreciated  having  their
VMs prepared for them on a weekly basis.
The  attacker  chatbot  approach  enabled  us  to  turn
defensive  and  incident  investigation  tasks  into
interactive  CTF  scenarios.  The  challenges  were
successfully  randomised  by  leveraging  SecGen;
although the degree of randomisation in a few of the
challenges was limited somewhat by weekly deadlines
to publish the labs and challenges to students. Students
didn’t find the randomisation of labs confusing. Most
students enjoyed the approach to learning, finding it fun
and engaging, and appreciated the interactive nature of
tasks. The assessment structure was prefered by many
students. 
The levels of student motivation was positive; however,
motivation scores (M=133.66, SD=25.20, N=34) were
lower  than  the  results  we  achieved  in  our  previous
gamification study (M=152.32, SD=18.13, N=12) [20].
Although  these  are  separate  students  with  a  small
sample size, this may indicate there would be benefits
to bringing back elements of gamification, such as XP,
visual indicators of leveling-up, and class ranks. 
The usability of Hackerbot was acceptable (M=75.75,
SD=16.37). Bangor et al. [24, p. 592] presents guidance
on  interpreting  SUS results,  and  state  that  “products
which are at least passable have scores above 70”.
Many  of  the  technical  issues  identified  have  already
been  addressed  with  code and  configuration  updates.
We had not granted access to students to control VM
snapshots  to  avoid  the  potential  for  cheating,  since
oVirt  also  ties  disk  management/access  to  the  same
permission.  However,  this  is  only an  issue  when the
VM stores flags, and so we now take the approach that
we  grant  more  privileges  to  students  for  their  VMs,
except for hackerbot servers.
10. Future work
Our plans for future work include further development
of  labs  and  challenges,  including  new  types  of
challenges. There is also the potential to further explore
opportunities in storytelling and narrative (for example,
[2]), by expanding the bot framework with non-linear
storytelling, including the use of multiple bots. We are
building a new portal which will replace the MyFlags
interface,  and  provide  a  new  front  end  for  SecGen,
enabling  dynamic  generation  of  labs  and  CTF
competitions.
11. Conclusions
Hackerbot is a unique approach for teaching computer
security.  Students  can  interact  with  a  simulated
malicious attacker, who challenges them to complete a
variety  of  security  tasks,  including  defensive  and
investigatory  challenges.  Challenges  are  randomised
using  SecGen,  and  deployed  onto  a  cloud-based
infrastructure.  Results  were  encouraging,  finding  the
approach  convenient,  engaging,  fun,  and  interactive;
while significantly decreasing the marking workload.
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